Speaker 1pt
Ladies and gentlemen, I will continue.
Speaker 1de
Whenever it’s too late, it ends up in the till.
Speaker 2de
Yes, yes, of course.
Speaker 3en
So good afternoon, everyone. We will start today's meeting with the adoption of the agenda. If there is no objection, the agenda is adopted. Interpretation will be available today in 12 languages. Now we will move to the adoption of the minutes of the meeting of the 10th and 28th September 2026. If there is no objection, the minutes of the meeting are adopted. Now, report on ongoing inter-institutional negotiation and the single currency package. It was the fixed trilogue. This. Covered the regulation on the establishment of digital euro, the provision of digital euro services by payment services provider, incorporated in member states whose currency is not the euro. And the legal tender of Euro Banklands and coins. This trilogue was held on November the 5th in the council. The negotiation continued on different political points, as a result of the exchanges some topics were delegated to the technical level, limited items of the legal tender of cash regulation, and the relevant provision regarding the distribution of digital euro, whereas others were not conclusive or not discussed due to time constraints. The technical help of the Commission was requested to further advance on the negotiation, especially on designated PSPs and sanctions. The next trilogue is scheduled for another November 18 in the European Parliament. And this is a perfect transition because I would like to welcome to the Economic Committee Mr. Piero Cipollane, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, who will update us on the latest developments on digital euro. The ECB continues working on its pilot project on visage to kick off in the second half of 2027. And involving the industry to be ready for a potential first insurance of the digital euro in 2029. The ECB launched a series of calls for expression of interest to the industry for this purpose. Regarding the legislation process, the inter-institutional negotiation with the Council continues as you know. And today, Mr. Cipollane will update us on the ECB's continued work on the
digital euro project, notably the pilot project building on the exchange we had with him in this committee in June. So I will give the floor to Mr. Cipollane for five minutes or a little bit more if it is needed, and then there will be a Q&A session with the member of the Economic Committee. Again, welcome, Piero.
Speaker 4en
Dear Chair, dear Honorable Members of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, it is a pleasure to be back here for the first time since the Parliament adopted its position on the single currency package, and I am very much welcome the broad support it received in the plenary session of July 9. This gives a strong democratic backing to the digital euro. Let me also thank you for the considerable work and constructive dialogue that have made this progress possible. A swift conclusion of the ongoing trilogue negotiation would pave the way for the adoption of the single currency package by the end of the year, as foreseen in the One Europe One Market roadmap. This gives us the legal certainty needed to complete our preparation for the digital euro. It would also give certainty to the market regarding the planned date for a possible first issuance, which can be set only after the regulation is adopted. A delay in the adoption could instead postpone the introduction of the digital euro further entrench Europe's dependence on foreign providers and make it more difficult for European companies to innovate and compete. Europe's achievements in payment innovation go beyond progress on the digital euro, in September we launched Pontes, which connects market distributed ledger technologies platform with the euro system target services. The launch was widely welcomed by market, with 18 market participants and DLT operators onboarded on day one, and many other preparing to join soon. Pontes makes the settlement of tokenized transactions in central bank money an operational reality and is a major milestone in the development of digital European capital markets. On November 2, it settled the issuance of the ESM-first digital native benchmark bond for 1 billion, facilitating the shift in European tokenized finance from experimentation to adoption. While I am happy to answer any question on Pontes, I would like to focus my remarks today on the digital euro and cash. We are moving ahead with preparation for the digital euro pilot.
It will test the digital euro's technical functionalities, operational processes, and user experience using a beta version without legal tender status. Starting in the second half of 2027, the pilot will involve the euro system staff, participating payment service providers, and selected merchants offering everyday services, for example in canteen at ACB and participating national central banks. We have seen strong market interest in the pilot and in July. We announced the 36 PSP selected to join the pilot from more than 50 applicants. They include banks of and non-banks providers, and covers a broad range of business model, size, and geographical location. We are working closely with participating PSPs to hear their views and benefit from their experience. In September, we opened an additional call for online and mobile merchants to join the pilot to test remote payments. The final selection of merchants will be announced early next year. This collaboration with the market player is essential. The digital euro must work on a technical level, but also in everyday life for consumer merchants and PSPs. Looking further ahead, we are planning for the digital euro rollout. On our side, we plan to ensure that all relevant use cases for digital euro are made technically available from first issuance. At the same time, feedback from market participants showed that a gradual rollout would support a smooth and successful first issuance by giving them sufficient time to adopt. We are glad that the college's letter intends to provide legal certainty on the feasibility of such a phase rollout in shops. In preparation for first issuance, we are also working closely with the market on the digital euro innovation platform. In September, we launched a new call for expression of interest inviting private companies and organizations to explore how the digital euro can foster market innovation. The next wave of activities includes testing conditional payments and exploring application of
artificial intelligence in payments will run from January to June 2027. Innovation also extends to banknotes. In July, we invited Europeans to share their views on 10 shortlisted design proposals for the new euro banknotes, based on themes European culture and river and birds. The surveys received almost 10 million responses. With the high participation across all euro area countries, and age groups, this demonstrates how deeply Europeans care about their money. The survey results will inform the ECB governing council decision on the final design concept, expected around the end of this year. At that point, we will publish the survey result. First, the nomination of the new banknotes series are expected to enter into circulation in the early 2030. But cash must also remain widely available at an accepted in practice. We therefore support strong legislative provision on mandatory cash acceptance, access to cash across euro area and. Resilience of cash infrastructure. Let me conclude. In today's uncertain geopolitical environment, timely progress on the digital euro is essential to strengthen Europe's autonomy in payments. We are doing our part by progressing with the technical preparation, but the adoption of the legal framework is necessary to finalize the digital euro design and rulebook, and ultimately to issue the digital euro. In two months' time, we will mark the 25th anniversary of Eurobanknotes and Coins entering circulation. While cash is still widely used in shops, digital payments are growing. I therefore hope that by then we will have a strong legal framework in place one that both safeguards the acceptance of cash and gives European a digital form of cash along it. Thank you, Chair.
Speaker 1en
Thank you.
Speaker 2en
Thank you so much.
Speaker 2sl
Slovenian for the question, three minutes for the answer, and I'll start with the EPP and Mr Avtjas.
Speaker 1sl
Thank you. Dear colleagues, I will speak in Greek.
Speaker 1el
because you are very experienced, I want four quick answers so that the European citizen can be informed. First, how will you block tax evasion? Through the digital euro. Secondly, how much will merchants' fees be reduced? Thirdly, what will the withdrawal limit be? And fourthly, what will the process be for transferring cash into the digital euro? Four crucial questions for citizens. If the euro does not reach the ordinary citizen, then we are in trouble.
Speaker 4en
So I'm not completely sure I understood completely the question, but let me try to answer. So on tax evasion, we are not a fiscal authority, as you imagine. What we are doing here is providing a means of payments for. People. So I'm. I have hard time to relate this question to tax evasion. On the cost of the. If I understand exactly, you are asking what is the impact on the merchants for the digital euro. Now, this is the compensation. This is the compensation model. This is in your own hands. I understand that this point in time there are two proposals that could be complemented each other. One proposal is to set a cap at the European level which is sort of average of what people pay now. Which means that this is going to favor especially small merchants which are the ones that now pay the highest price. And this is one proposal. Alongside with this proposal, there is also this proposal of the no worth of solution which means that even for those below that already pay below the cap, there will be a provision to make sure that their price will not increase. Now, how this is going to be implemented technically is not clear, but this is not for us to decide. This has been discussed by the. Colleges later. As we said always say, we stand ready to provide technical assistance if it's needed, whenever it's needed. So that's the situation. What we can say for sure that given the current proposal we expect that the. Especially the small merchant will. Pay less. But this paying less is not paid by other people except that because what we are trying what we do with the system through the digital euro we will not charge scheme fees which is a. Important cost component of the actual scheme. By removing the scheme fees, this saving could be distributed along the supply chain. So merchant could benefit but also banks and PSP can benefit from that. So I'm sorry I lost your last question. I don't know.
Speaker 2en
It was 14 minutes, I see.
Speaker 4en
Oh, on the old.
Speaker 2en
I think it was 14 minutes, yeah.
Speaker 1el
Withdrawal limits? To stop money from leaving the banks.
Speaker 3el
And thirdly, the process of transferring liquid assets into digital form.
Speaker 1el
If someone has €30,000 in the bank, how much will they transfer to the digital wallet? What will that limit be?
Speaker 3el
Bankers are afraid there will be a large outflow of capital into the digital euro. How will this be prevented? But first, on tax evasion, you have disappointed me. Just so you know. On the first issue of tax evasion, you left us hanging. And I am very sorry about that. You must take action.
Speaker 4en
Let me go back to this issue. Now I understood better. I don't understand why you think that digital euro will increase the tax evasion. I don't see this. This will be a transaction that will be— Will go essentially through. Through the current system. So I don't see how this is going to increase the tax evasion. There could be a case in which for the peer-to-peer but this is going to have a— I hope. I imagine that there will be a cap on the single transaction for the offline solution. And this is in any case at the merchant level this should be registered in the cash register. So I don't really see how this is going to increase tax evasion. I really don't see. Actually there is— We have been accused by that we are doing this to remove to, you know, to. Avoid tax evasion. So I don't see this. On the holding limits, you know the process, right? There will be a proposal by the ECB if the current legislation is approved because I'm still pending this. If the current legislation is approved the ECB will make a proposal in agreement. Or in consultation with the Commission. This will go to the Council and the Council can approve or not this— This amount. This is the cap. The maximum amount. Within this cap the ECB is free to set the holding limits. Depending on how much. Now,. And this is for the holdings. But there is no limits for the transaction. So you can spend as much money as you want through the digital euro. There is no— At least in the current legislation proposal there is no limit to the amount of that you can spend through the digital euro. The cap is referred to the amount that you can hold on your wallet. Now, whether people will transfer this— Whether people will transfer their deposit from the bank account into the digital euro we provide to this committee one year ago a detailed study that shows that this is not a real concern. You may remember that we provide you guys a study in which we simulated the impact on the banking sector of possible holding limits starting from 500 euros up to
3,000 with under two possible scenarios. One scenario is business as usual and one scenario is, you know, a case of critical crisis so that all people would use the— To move as much money they could into the digital euro. So even in this extreme scenario the simulation that is available we made available to this committee show that there will be no impact on the financial stability only 13 banks would hit the liquidity cover ratio which is the liquidity requirements by the regulators. And the amount of assets managed by these 13 banks is like zero. Three percent of the total asset of the euro area. And we are talking about this extreme case scenario. So I don't— I mean I can just reiterate what we showed in the study that we don't see any concern on the financial stability.
Speaker 2en
Thank you. Now I give the floor to the SND to Nikos Papamareou.
Speaker 4en
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Mr. Cipollane, again for being here. So there has been a difficult process and I want to just emphasize one element of that difficulty. The debate has too often been shaped by the established commercial instruments of the large banks and the larger member states. They hold the largest stakes in their domestic card schemes and they naturally want to protect them. The voice has been loud. The voice of merchants and citizens has not, at least of all in small countries. In Greece we have the IRIS which is instant payment system and people are happy with that but we have no domestic card scheme and that includes many other countries. Neither do most euro area countries. We have for card payments Visa or MasterCard. So the digital euro for us is not just a nice addition. It is the first European payment that our citizens and merchants could use for everyday purchases and that's what sovereignty means. But it will really only work if it is a real alternative. If the digital euro costs the same in Athens or Tallinn as the international schemes no merchant has a reason to choose it. And the banks have no reason to offer it. We would have done all this work to build an instrument that changes nothing where it matters most. So this is not big versus small countries. It is a simple question. Isn't this project designed to protect established commercial interests and to give every euro area citizen of the European choice? And I would like to hear again what you said a little bit earlier. So the ECB supports the idea that scheme fees which be publicly supported must be factored into reducing the above average result to a fair distribution between payment providers and all merchants including small merchants. As opposed to only the cap. So you agree with the average but also we have the scheme fee which was quite a strong position from the SND. Thank you. From the very beginning— Thank you first of all for this question. I mean from the very beginning these are not been a mystery, right?
We have been saying look we are not— The ECB is not going to charge an important part of the cost which is part of the cost that are borne by the merchant is in the current system is going to remunerate the scheme. And this is not a marginal point. This is not a marginal— Let me be a little bit more explicit on this. We are talking in absolute of a no huge numbers. But when you talk about merchants that run their business on a three, four percent margin if you take away from that cost only few basis points this is a huge effect. So it's not— If you are a small merchant and you live out of, you know, maybe three, four percent your charge your— The margin that you have on your product. If you can reduce any small amount no matter how small this is a huge improvement. So from the very beginning we said we remove the cost a big component of cost which is the scheme fee and the process fee. And then we— And this is our role, right? To design a system that provides some saving to the system. Now, how this saving will be distributed along the chain it's not for us to decide what we have said we have said to the legislator please guys distribute this saving so that everyone has something to gain because to construct a scheme you need incentive to from everyone to participate. So a fair distribution of this scheme of this saving would be the ideal things to do. So the cap is meant to protect the small merchant because at this point you impose to the merchant to accept the digital euro it's fair that you protect them against some possible increase in the price. So what we have been recommending is a fair distribution of this saving so that all the actor involved have an incentive to participate. And this has been the philosophy from the very beginning. And I hope this will be reflected in the final legislation.
Speaker 2en
Thank you for ECR Marlena Malag.
Speaker 1pl
Thank you, Mr President. I have a question regarding forced acceptance. digital euro. Does the ECB really believe in the attractiveness of this digital euro product? Or rather does it not believe in it, and sees its widespread adoption as hinging on compulsory acceptance? through sellers? If the digital euro offered real value, there would be no need to pressure sellers to accept it. This, after all, entails additional costs for them. Acceptance of the digital euro should rather be entirely voluntary. And how do you see this matter? Should the single currency package impose such an obligation or not necessarily? Thank you very much.
Speaker 4en
So let me take— This is an important question and maybe often overlooked. So let me give— Take a little bit of time to explain this. So from the very beginning we have been asking why are we doing this? We are doing this because we want to provide something that is very much like cash. That can be used for those use cases that cannot where cash cannot be used. We are talking about a large part of our expenditure. One third of our expenditure is online. Which means that citizen do not have the freedom to use their money cash to pay for important use cases. Our responsibility as a central bank is to provide means of payments to people. So we need to complement cash with the solution that allows them to pay with their money. So the digital euro is an online version of the cash. And cash we have been— You are also discussing this— Is a legal tender. Legal tender. All country have a legal tender. So because of the digital euro is— A digital version of cash. He also has to inheritage this legal tender status. But this is not— This is not something strange. This is the money of the sovereign. And by definition the money of the sovereign is able to free you from obligation. So this is not a commercial— This is not a commercial product. This has to do with the possibility of people to retain the freedom to pay with the money of their— Sovereign. Now, the fact that this might imply some small cost for merchant it may. Be but if we look at the reality merchants small and large from any corner of Europe have been supporting this idea. Which means that the saving that they can make by accepting the digital euro are far larger than the small adoption cost that they will incur. I mean if the digital euro were a drug on the profitability of small merchant we would have heard them. We had exactly the opposite. Whenever we meet them they say us do it quickly. Do it quickly. Because this is essential for us to save money and gain transparency from the fees that other player are bringing to the table.
Thank you.
Speaker 2en
Thank you. Ludovic Todor for renew.
Speaker 4en
Thank you and thank you for this interesting discussion. I'm not really afraid of the merchants because they should gain from the digital euro. My question is about two other things which are really important. One thing is public acceptance and there you need a kind of a user experience comparable to other solutions. And if the banking sector is not supporting enough the project then of course they can you know make sure that the user experience with electronic money is a little bit different than the user experience with digital euro. So can you comment on this? And the second one is related to the debate we had in the European Parliament whether to introduce the digital euro or to support private sector solutions. So my question is right now how do you see it? Is there a chance to have a complementary system where you have a kind of a digital euro backbone and private solutions on it? Or the banking sector will try to come out with their own solution to this problem?
Speaker 3en
Thank you. These are two questions but in some sense they point to the same issue. Now, definitely the public acceptance depends on the user experience. So we are working hard to design user experience that is top class. As you can imagine we are running Focus Group. But in doing so we don't want to leave anyone out. We are not a commercial— We are not a commercial product. So inclusiveness for us is a very, very important— Very, very important feature. So we are trying to build this feature in the rulebook so that easy access, easy usability— Easy to understand are— We are trying to build in the rulebook and in order to give a physical representation of that we are developing our own app which would embed all these feature. And that's why we have been asking for making mandatory the distribution of the app. Now, the discussion will go— I mean— So in. To make sure that everyone will be in. Some sense encouraged to distribute the digital euro and not to keep the project you. Need to work on the incentives. So we have been working with the private sector from the very beginning to try to construct a product that would be— Would encourage them to distribute. We have already talked about the compensation model but there is something more. We said to the private solution— The private solution reach at this point in time in Europe is limited. Is limited at the national level or the use cases. So in order for them to provide a full coverage throughout the euro area and for all use cases normally the domestic solution coverage with the international card scheme. But any time that the client uses the international card scheme they would lose fees and data. So if they could coverage with the digital euro instead of the international card scheme this would improve their financial result. And we think this is an efficient incentive for them to not to hide too much the digital euro. At the same time— At the same time the. Possibility to coverage with the digital euro and the fact that the private scheme can reuse our
acceptance network. Should favor their ability to expand their reach beyond the current reach that they have. Let me make an example so that everyone can understand. Today if a private sector solution wants to expand in a market that is not covered this private solution has to go and convince merchant by merchant to adopt the standard that this private solution adopts. And this is very costly and timely consuming. With the digital euro the acceptance network will be already there because of what we were saying before about the. Legal tender. So the private sector can leverage already the acceptance network that is there because of the digital euro so I expect that there will be a composition of solution. The digital euro could provide— Would provide a backbone and certainly on which private sector can develop new solution and. Provide their services. This is particularly important though because for the time that we are living we know that a little bit of resilience and redundance in the system is essential because anything can happen. So if we have different way to allow our people to pay regardless possible accident outages I think it's especially considering the time we are living in I think that is a smart things to do.
Speaker 1en
Thank you for the green Damian Bazleger.
Speaker 2en
Yes. It's nice to see you here again. As you know we are in the middle of the negotiations on the digital euro and there are some of the negotiating team here. I want to ask on the sanctions. You call the digital euro sovereign cash a couple of times. And I understand that we have seen recently the European Commission underline that under the payments accounts directive third country like nation sanctions that come here do not deprive citizens of the right to the basic bank account. So this is already for commercial bank accounts. But still we had heard from the ICC judges and maybe some others that they have issues accepting even their basic bank account services. Which they have— Which they are entitled to under our rules. So if you think that the digital euro is supposed to be sovereign cash shouldn't it be made extra clear that for example people who are unbanked because of any other reasons that may be unfair that the digital euro at least should be fully and in its audits entirety preserved. That's the first question. And the second one would be shouldn't we also use the digital euro with potentially a specific regime for these people which could be triggered in multiple ways in order to allow institutions entities and individuals who are affected by these sanctions to potentially have additional holding higher holding limits higher transaction limits and so on. This is one question and because this was easy I'll just give you a second one and it's about the access to mobile devices. I mean in the text it says that basically yeah mobile phone providers should make deals with commercial banks when it comes to you know the digital euro apps on their phones and the functionality. This is not true for those falling under the DMA where basically full functionality needs to be provided but they also mobile phone providers or producers which do not fall under the DMA and so I was just wondering do you have any views on whether this should potentially also be free of charge rather than
subject to negotiation. Thank you.
Speaker 3en
So— I'm trying to find a simple answer to your first very long question and complicated question. So let me step back a little bit on this right. From the very beginning and I already said that we designed the digital euro to be as inclusive as possible. And for everyone to use. So in order to implement this we have built an infrastructure that doesn't depend on anybody else but on us. On Europeans. Now I think this is a sufficient base to provide. Some solution that can be found possibly at the technical level to make sure that no one is cut out of a basic services like payment. So this is my answer to your first question and to your second question obviously for us having the all the providers under the article 33 would be the best thing. If we can— If we can implement that in a direct way this is a straightforward— A straightforward way to implement this solution this would be the best way forward.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. I give the floor to Pasquale Tredico for the left.
Pasquale TridicoThe Leften
Thank you. Thank you to you Mr. Cipollone. Thank you to Damian because he just made a question which I wanted to do but I want to go a little bit deeper on this question Mr. Cipollone. Because actually there is an issue which is very sensitive in Italy right now and apart from the perspective of getting a solution on that through the digital euro I would like to have if possible an answer from you. I'm referring to the sanction that Banca Etica is receiving from US. Which basically does. Not allow to an association called Autistici Immaginari to get their services and their money with the condition if Banca Etica provides services to Autistici Immaginari that actually 130,000 client of Banca Etica would be basically sanctioned as well. It's an issue which concerns as well doctors from. Cuba working in a region that you know very well which is Calabria which is basically getting the same sanction because actually they are working there. So this situation is basically unsustainable right now. I wonder whether the ECB is trying to fix or to create an umbrella for those institution which actually have apart from those associations Cuban doctors or Autistici Immaginari they have thousand and thousand of clients which risk as well their services. Being sanctioned by. US. Sanction which are of course not recognized.
Speaker 3en
Now. This is a very complicated question for one fundamental reason. The source of this issue has to do with the fact that the dollar. Is the dominant currency around the world. So banks will even if you solve the individual problem point is that even receiving a payments from a bank that has been sanctioned could be a risk for the receiving banks because the Americans can prevent you to have access to the dollar system. So if you do any transaction in dollar and you do business with someone that has been sanctioned you could be subject to sanction. This is a decision a unilateral decision by the US. There is no much the ECB can do. What the ECB is doing on this general front is to reinforce the international role of the euro. When we talk about you know international role of the euro we also talked about this. So this is the we need to understand the game. So it's not you can if you are afraid that to do business with someone that has been sanctioned you could be sanctioned as well which means that you don't fund yourself in dollar this is a huge risk. So people will not enter to that. There is no much you can do unless you know you slowly move into an environment where you can do business and. You know finance your client even if they you know because they don't need any longer dollars because they do other things. On the specific though what the digital euro can do on that. Starting from the point you are saying I mean the infrastructure the digital euro infrastructure is independent. Depend on us on the ECB. So we can allow anyone to transact. The point is— You need to find within the euro the digital euro ecosystem an entity that doesn't need to fund itself in dollars. Because then this entity can provide the services. And especially through the offline solution people could pay because the offline solution is not it's like exchanging cash. So I that's why I was answering before that the setting is there. We need to find fine tune solution that would allow us to provide for specific
case and. Because the contest is what it is. So we need to the I repeat that the technical infrastructure is there that would allow us to in some sense overcome this problem. But there is no as far as I can understand and I've been thinking about that for a while I couldn't find any overarching solution. So we need to look into the specifics and see if we can do something at the specific level. The advantage again is this that the infrastructure is depends essentially on the ECB and therefore we can allow anyone to transact. The problem is the at the local level at the bank level. So you need to find an entity that it's not conditioned by its need to fund itself in dollar. If you find an. Network of those entity we would have overcome the problem.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. I know give the floor to Regina Duarte for EPP.
Regina DohertyPPEen
Thanks chair. And Mr. Cipollone you're very welcome. It's a very interesting conversation and where you're rightly point out that the delivery of the digital euro obviously is a key commitment for all of the co-legislators under One Europe One Market. And we see now that the plan is to reach an agreement at the open-ended trilogue on November the 18th. So I'm really sure that everybody will be constructive flexible and obviously engage very meaningfully because we know that the strategic importance of the project if there's any further delay it will obviously impact the first issuance by the ECB. And I think from our perspective delivery on this project is something that we all should obviously be thinking it's a priority. So I have two questions there. Number one is if the negotiations are prolonged what impact do you think this will have on the digital euro's launch and what impact do you expect that to have on Europe's strategic autonomy as a result. And secondly more briefly I want to ask you about the discussion on costs with the merchants within the overall cap. What is the ECB's view on whether there should be still room for negotiation within the overall cap and do you think that this will impact the success ultimately of the project. Thank you.
Speaker 3en
So um. So from the very beginning we have been saying um. We need more or less two and a half year to. Roll out the digital euro from the moment in which we have the legislation in place. When I say the legislation in place I mean on the journal. On the official journal. Why are we so formal if you want? I'll just give you an example. I need to give to an instruction to the people that are developing the software how many accounts people can have. This is you know as a trivial issue but they need to write the code in such a way that would. Provide for the specific request that is in the legislation. Now this is an extreme example but there are many many dimension like that. So the finalization of the finalization of the code will require to have a legislation. But think about the rulebook. The rulebook are the rule of the game. How are payments is processed. This has to be spelled out step by step. So we always said there are these two and a half years that are needed because then you have to roll out all the scheme so you'd need these two and a half year from the moment you have the legislation in place. Obviously you know if we delay the end game the moment in which we will be able to roll out the digital euro will be postponed. So the damage would be that we. Cannot address the urgent problem that we have in terms of strategic autonomy and the time goes I mean if not if we delay things get worse. Because we know that non-European players are gaining market share in Europe. So the more we delay the worse the situation the more entrenched will be our dependency. That's why we have been advocating from the very beginning to be quick. So internally at the ECB we are forcing we are running really running to squeeze as much as possible the technical time in order to be able to deliver and to. Roll out the digital euro as soon as possible. On the cap I mean this is really this is really I. A little bit an easy to talk about that because you know I am a central bank. A central bank do central bank issue. This is a fiscal decision if you want.
It's how you distribute resources across the your constituency and citizen. So we think that we are taking out of the system a lot of cost and therefore providing to the system enough saving that could incentivize everyone to to participate. So my recommendation is to everyone don't be greedy. Understand that everyone need to have some incentive to participate. Because if we roll out this everyone will benefit. Not just will benefit definitely from a financial point of view but also as a citizen and in terms of our own freedom and ability to master our own destiny.
Speaker 1en
Thank you so much and you're absolutely right. Time is running again. So this is why we need the council to be open-minded to negotiate and I give the floor to Matias Ecke.
Matthias EckeS&Dde
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr Cipollone, let me ask you a question. It is about the obligation to adopt and possible exceptions to it. We all want the digital euro to become a successful model, a successful digital central bank currency and a public means of payment. I think that is extremely important. But of course, it must not lead to absurd situations either. And that is why the European Parliament has indeed laid down exceptions, going even further than the Commission's proposal, for small and micro-enterprises and private transactions. I would say that it would certainly not be helpful for the acceptance of the digital euro if the police were to storm a school flea market because digital euros are not accepted there. But at the same time, and this is a bit of my concern now in the negotiations, the exception must not go too far. Where would you say is the limit at which the digital euro still actually has the status of legal tender, that it is still a legal means of payment? Where is the limit of the exceptions that the co-legislators are now setting, where we risk losing the status as a digital means of payment, as a legal means of payment?
Speaker 3en
So thank you for this question. So I think that our initial proposal was a reasonable one. We said if you are a merchant you already accept some digital payments you could add the digital euro. It seems to me and this was more or less our initial proposal I think it's reasonable. So but again I mean I'm not so I can reiterate this because it comply is it simple and doesn't add much cost. To if you have already you know you already have your. Your backend connected to the front end where you receive digital payments it's not going to add much cost. Actually our estimate is that 80% of the machine to accept digital payments can be updated via software to accept the digital euro. So the marginal cost is very small. So we thought that from the very beginning that was this would could be a reasonable a reasonable a reasonable solution.
Speaker 1en
Thank you for ESN. Mr. Droze.
Speaker 4en
Yeah.
Speaker 2en
Thank you Chair. I speak German. Herr Cipollone
Speaker 2de
Thank you very much for your report. Indeed, Europeans love their money. I am one of them. Of course, I would most of all like to have the German mark back again. They do love it, but outside of these discussion rounds and probably outside their ECB headquarters, there are indeed significant reservations in society about the digital euro. And I think you will have to do a lot of work on that. The question I have is that, as you know, Ms Lagarde has effectively announced her early resignation from her mandate. She has made the digital euro one of her priorities. The wording suggests that the digital euro would be one of her priorities. So are there now any impacts on the digital euro project? I mean, are there any delays? And does the change in leadership within the ECB not provide grounds for reassessing the cost risks and benefits of the digital euro independently before entering into further significant financial and organisational commitments? And would it not be sensible to conclude the parliamentary negotiations and then allow the new ECB leadership to decide on the next steps? And a concrete question: what would happen if a large Member State, let’s say Germany in 2029, were led by other political forces and wanted to withdraw from the project? So what would then be the consequence of that? That is what I would be interested in. Thank you.
Speaker 3en
So let me answer for the department that has to do with the with the ECB. So ECB governance is a robust one. The decision so far about the development of the digital euro has been supported by the governing council. Which is constituted by all governors of the euro area central banks plus the six member of the governing council. Now of. The executive order. Sorry. So so far the decision has been unanimous on all the direction and all members of the governing council are being supporting this process. Now from what I hear I do not expect any change in the direction. Because the two names that have been you know put forward as a presidency they both in public occasion supported the digital euro and they were part of the governing council until few years ago. So they will I expect that they will keep supporting on the. Additionally the. Council that is the member states have agreed last year on the 18th of December to support their proposal with the unanimity. So I also hear a strong support from the member state. And also the parliament has voted with a large majority the proposal that you have reached the text that you have reached to. So so far I see a strong democratic backing for the digital euro. Then for the future I can I mean you know there is nothing more difficult than making predictions. So let me let me avoid too enter this difficult. Green.
Speaker 1en
Thank you for EPP. Ludek Nidamäe.
Luděk NiedermayerPPEen
Thank you very much. And it's good to have you here. I have two simple questions. Each is a little bit different. The first concern. Retail digital euro. How it would help with the problem of US sanctions to ICC court. You know that we have discussion about it. But if you can summarize how we would benefit from that one. And the second you know that European parliament often called for wholesale digital euro. I am pleased that in September you started the project Pontes if I am not mistaken. So do you have some kind of first first. Things that you learned during the first months of the operation.
Speaker 3en
So thank you for thank you this question. On the on the sanction I can reiterate what I said to to Mr. Trivigo in both lines. We are building a platform that depends only on us. So This per se per se just an additional layer that increase our strategic autonomy. In terms of how this can help whether the the how the digital euro infrastructure can help. It can help us as. Long as we found within the PSP that distribute the digital euro a network that. Are resilient to the sanction from the US. Because they don't need to fund themselves in dollar. The real problem is that our banking sector you know has to fund in dollar for many activities. And so people are people that conduct normal business banking business may be concerned not to have access to to to US dollars. So as long as we can find a set of PSP that do only the distribution of the digital euro and do not need to to fund in dollars I think that we can construct something that would be independent of the the of the specific sanction of the US. So we need to stay flexible and and and. Have the space to address case by case. On the whole sale yes indeed has been a big success. On the 21st we launched the digital euro. So what we learned Pontes. Pontes. What we we learned from Pontes. So you know that there has been this important important first transaction which was one billion euro issued by ESM. And. The most important I would say the most serious point that we learned is the fact that we can build a unified a unified framework. We can build an integrated platform in Europe but we will not achieve a full integration of our capital market especially on the tokenization part unless we don't do something at the legislative level. We could reproduce what we are seeing is that in the absence of a solution a European regulation for digital asset member states are already developing their own the. Own legislative their own domestic regulation which might not be compatible the next door regulation. So we could be in a situation in which we could be able to construct an
integrated financial market but at the legislative level reproduce the fragmentation that we have today. This would be a pity because that would be a loss opportunity. So I think that we need to seriously start to think on how to avoid this fragmentation at the at the national level. The second things we learned is that the uptight for the for the tokenization is large and that we we could expect. So we are seeing a kind of snowball effect. And many people coming to us and see and say how can we import and and and. Use this technology. Just just to give you an example. France is thinking to tokenize all the commercial paper and distribute on DLT. We are talking about a market of 300 billion a year. Not not a small feat. And other and other institution are thinking to use to use the digital euro. Sorry the wholesale solution. For us. For example I was in Bangkok for the annual meeting and many international supernational institution came to me to understand how how they can use this solution to provide the cash leg to their transaction in of tokenized asset.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. Any catchy eyes. Yes Eveline Ragner. Thank you very much for all your answers and for being here. Mr. Cipollone a very simple question but I think it's a difficult to deal with that in in the outside world. There is tons and lots of disinformation and misinformation and of course it helps very much when you're right now here and answering very patiently to all those questions. But this especially disinformation I mean just has the purpose to tell lies about the digital euro and the implications and there's a lot of absurdistan out there. Do you pick up some of them and just I mean though it might sound ridiculous sometimes with these arguments like okay the digital euro will create a fee to pay the commission and finance it and all these things of course that have nothing to do with reality. Is there something that you pick up even if it's very absurd if it's completely wrong in order to face those lies that are in the digital world so much present.
Speaker 3en
Oh as you can imagine we we face constantly this kind of problem. And we try to answer in a we are an institution. And we we have an institutional language as you can imagine. So we provide information. And we try to to make it as simple as possible to distribute this this information as much as much as possible. So our you know the website that we try to be on the on the social. But so far we have a huge impediment. We cannot make an a proactive communication why. Because we cannot be ahead of ourself. How can we communicate on a product or on a solution that does not exist. That's why it's so important that you guys reach an agreement. Because you will give birth to this baby. Then we will be in a condition to make it grow fast and robust. But we cannot be give them it birth. It's to you. So I cannot go around telling the virtues of the digital euro because the digital euro does not exist. Then you guys could be legitimately asking me why are you publicizing something that does not exist and you are not being authorized to. To issue. That is why it's important. Obviously we are planning to have strong campaign. But we can roll out this campaign only when we will have the legitimacy of the of the college's leader because thanks to God we live in a democracy and as where rule of law is. You know govern our behavior. So please help us to you know to fight this um. Fake news I would say you know. And there are many actors that we will see and we see it every day. Can I can I have one more second.
Speaker 1en
No.
Speaker 3en
Sure. You know three. Years ago four years ago when we started to talk about strategic autonomy independent of Europe it looked and that we were exposed to many external threat. It seemed an esoteric discussion. Four years later we are suffering this on our own skin every day. Not just for payments. So it's about time that we wake up and we try to build something that make. Us wake up in the morning and be a little bit reassured that we at least in part are are master our own destiny.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. Any request for the floor? No. So thank you my dear Piero Cipollone. It may be that the next time you you come in the committee we will have a deal.
Speaker 3en
Absolutely.
Speaker 1en
On digital euro.
Speaker 3en
I will bring a champagne.
Speaker 1en
I hope. At least champagne. Thank you so much for your time and thank you for the exchange of you.
Okay. So we can now turn to the point six of the agenda on the competitiveness of the banking sector as in European Union own initiative report. The purpose of this initiative report is to present the position of the European Parliament on various issues ahead of the 2027 banking package. So it can be considered by the European Commission. More than 500 amendments were tabled. I will give the floor not to the rapporteur but to Marco Sverber who will speak on behalf of the rapporteur Isabelle Benjumea.
Isabel Benjumea BenjumeaPPEen
Thank you very much President. I will read Ms. Benjumea's message because she cannot be here today with us. So I start quoting. Over the past few years European competitiveness has been undermined by an ever-increasing bureaucratic and regulatory burden. Our banking sector is suffering. The consequences. The European regulatory framework governing EU banks now exceeds 95,000 pages. Today we have more resilient banks but we also have banks that are at a competitive disadvantage compared with those in other jurisdictions. They continue to operate in a fragmented market with national barriers excessively complex rules and high compliance costs. All this limits their ability to invest to grow and to finance our economy. And this affects us all. This is why reviewing this legislative framework is an urgent priority. 552 amendments have been tabled to the draft report. As the European Parliament's rapporteur she is working with the rest of political groups to deliver an ambitious text with around five priorities. First completing the banking union and removing the remaining barriers in the single market. Second making competitiveness a secondary objective for European supervisory authorities. Third reducing duplication and unnecessary regulatory burdens. Fourth facilitating banking consolidation. And fifth promoting the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence and tokenization. She's confident that with the contributions of the shadow rapporteurs they can reach an agreement on an ambitious report. This will enable the European Parliament to enter the debate on the major regulatory package that the Commission plans to present in 2027 with a strong and coherent position. Europe needs bank that can compete and invest. Banks that finance the growth of our businesses and support entrepreneurs. We have an opportunity to provide them with a framework that enables them to do so. We must therefore act with ambition. That's what I have to say in the name of Isabelle.
Speaker 1en
Thank you so much. I give the floor to the shadow and we'll start with SND and Ronas Fernandez.
Jonás FernándezS&Den
Thank you Chair. I will speak in Spanish.
Jonás FernándezS&Des
First of all, I would like to thank Isabelle Benjumea and her entire team and send a big hug to her APA, who has had a small accident that seems it might have some consequences; let's hope it gets resolved quickly. In any case, first of all, as I say, I would like to thank Benjumea for the draft report and the work of these last few weeks in which we have tried, in short, to find areas of agreement, due among other things to the large number of amendments that we have all submitted. SANDI's position on this matter is quite clear. And we could summarise it as follows: we hope that this INI will help ensure that the legislative proposal the Commission presents next year helps to reduce the fragmentation of the single market, particularly within the Union. Banking, because behind fragmentation lie the serious competitiveness problems that in some cases we can find in our banking sector. This fragmentation affects first and foremost the consolidation of the Banking Union. We face significant national barriers that prevent us from taking advantage of the efficiencies of the banking union. The management of liquidity or capital cannot be handled efficiently across the entire Banking Union. This fragmentation also explains part of the additional buffers that, in short, national supervisors impose to protect themselves from risks in other jurisdictions even within the Banking Union. and all of them are supervised by the SSM. And these fragmentation problems, as I say, generate cost increases, loss of opportunities and, as I say, losses of efficiency in the consolidation of the single market. These fragmentation problems also affect capital requirements; for example, at the time, Parliament sought to apply the output flow at consolidated level only, but to the extent that we have a fragmented market, we ended up applying the output flow at both levels, and when we talk about the complexity of the supervisory framework
certainly, we are facing a complex framework because once again we have a fragmentation problem. Therefore, we must consolidate the banking union, we must liberalise or facilitate the use of capital and liquidity waivers, we need to review some of those buffers that are imposed as a result of fragmentation, and to resolve all of this, having a European deposit system is essential. It is not the only instrument; we also need other types of safeguards, but a future EDIS or a future European deposit framework is central. And one final message: the competitiveness of the European banking sector will not be resolved by reviewing prudential treatments. This resilience of the current European banking sector is the result of a very significant prudential effort, and thanks to that prudential effort, the financing costs, for example, of banking institutions are substantially lower than in another environment where prudential frameworks were relaxed. Therefore, we believe that banking competitiveness depends on the consolidation of the single market and not on the revision of prudential frameworks, which contribute greatly to that competitiveness. Thank you.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. For PFI, Tomás Cubín.
Tomáš KubínPfEen
Thank you Madam Chair. I'll speak in Czech language.
Tomáš KubínPfEcs
Just like my predecessors, I would also like to thank the rapporteur and her team, because the work they have done, given the large number of amendments and the very diverse positions on the individual topics covered in the report, is truly not to draft a joint parliamentary position, and the entire negotiating team led by the rapporteur has been working on this for a month now, and I believe we are not far from a text that we will all be able to support. But I would also like to thank the other shadow rapporteurs, because the communication and the work on this text is truly constructive, and I must say it really pleases me personally. Last week we had a meeting of the shadow rapporteurs after which there was a technical-level meeting where our assistants really put in a lot of work. And I personally must say that I am very pleased. Last week we had a meeting of the shadow rapporteurs, followed by technical-level negotiations where our assistants really put in a lot of work. On many points, we largely agree: we do not want duplicate regulatory burdens for banks, we want to simplify complex processes, but this must not come at the expense of resilience and financial stability—not only of the European Union as a whole, but also of all individual Member States. This is also related to another point that is being widely discussed in the context of the upcoming banking package, if we may call it that, and that is the efficient allocation of capital and liquidity in cross-border banking groups. We understand that for large banks, their dream would come true if what we might call the dissolution of capital within the entire group were to be implemented, rather than having to take proper account of the individual affiliations in each country. However, we must also be aware of the impact on the host countries where these large foreign banks operate through their the so-called ring-fencing of capital and liquidity has entirely rational reasons and objectives, the purpose of which is nothing other than the financial stability of the country in question. The reports under discussion therefore, together with other colleagues, we are seeking balanced formulations that will not merely highlight the benefits of the release of capital and liquidity, as has already been mentioned here, but also any potential risks. Last but not least, it is crucial for us that in the upcoming banking package we have sufficient
the specificities of the countries outside the euro area and therefore also outside the banking union have been taken into account. These countries face different risks and have different powers than the euro area countries. And we also appreciate that the rapporteur, in her report, does address this issue, albeit briefly, and we hope that these mentions will remain in the text going forward. So once again, thank you, and as I say, I believe we will soon be able to agree on that final text.
Speaker 1en
Thank you for ACR, Giovanni Corsetto.
Giovanni CrosettoECRit
Thank you, Mr President. I would also like to begin by thanking the rapporteur and my colleagues for the work carried out so far. We welcome the amendments aimed at strengthening the need for European investments and we must therefore be ambitious in addressing the structural constraints that penalise competitiveness. However, I would like to be clear: this is not about deregulation nor about weakening prudential requirements. Financial stability must remain the foundation of our banking system. However, this must not prevent us from improving the regulatory framework by removing unjustified constraints and making it more effective in supporting the real economy. In this context, we support the amendments that call for a prudential framework that is more proportionate to the actual risk. Simplification must make it possible to overcome regulatory overlaps and introduce targeted measures where the existing requirements are not justified by the underlying risks. This also means ensuring that the implementation of Basel 3 does not create competitive disadvantages for European banks. As regards sovereign exposures, we remain firmly opposed to the introduction of new constraints, including new risk weighting factors. Diversification must be market-driven, not imposed through regulatory interventions. Just as any possible revision of the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures should not become a condition for the completion of the banking union. As also recently stated by the European Central Bank. These are distinct objectives and the completion of the banking union must remain a priority. We also support a calibrated regime for small and non-complex institutions that allows banks individually classified as such to benefit from proportionate requirements. Eligibility should be assessed on the basis of the size of the business model, the complexity and the risk profile of each institution, regardless of its legal or organisational form.
As, among other things, highlighted by the European Commission in its report of 17 July. We also welcome the proposals aimed at strengthening banks' capacity to finance SMEs and families, as well as those aimed at a prudential framework that better reflects the actual risk profile of secured credit and mortgage credit. In particular, we would like to explore a prudential treatment that takes greater account of the stability of income and the repayment capacity of borrowers. We also consider it appropriate to promote a more consistent and homogeneous prudential treatment for insurance groups, as this could further facilitate consolidation operations that help channel savings towards productive investment. In line with the objectives of the Saving Investment Union. Thank you, Mr President.
Speaker 1en
Thank you for a new now I look from Brook.
Speaker 3en
Yes. Thank you Chair and I also would like to thank the rapporteur for the constructive discussions we had so far. For us it's a safe sound a stable banking system is absolutely essential. At the same time we must address the fragmentation of our banking market promote greater integration and ensure that competitive European banks can effectively finance our economy. Where rules and regulations can be simplified without compromising financial stability they should be simplified and renew stands ready to work constructively towards a banking system that is not safe not only safe and resilient but also more integrated and competitive. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. For the left.
Speaker 3fr
Thank you, Sarah Mo.
Speaker 2en
Thank you Madam Chair. I also would like to thank the rapporteur for her constructive approach. Unfortunately we do not share commissions and reports main premise. Banks they are making huge profits and there is no problem with competitiveness of the banks. So the commission's concern really lies with the bank's ability to finance the real economy. However even now the banks could finance more vital investments but they focus on the more profitable areas. You can't push on a rope the more banking regulation is dismantled the more certain it is that money will flow into speculation rather than the real economy. It is a genuine problem for Europe that in the US risk financing for scale-ups is significantly higher. But the difference is not on the banks but with the rest of the financial market. So briefly of our amendments the mandates of the supervisory authorities should not be blurred. History shows that the strong prudential safeguards are necessary and then they improve stability and eventually competitiveness. Of course when there are overlapping requirements or unnecessary burdens there is a room for rethinking and simplification. But the aggregate level of required capital buffers should not be reduced. While focusing too narrowly on certain aspects raised by the banking sector the draft is missing an opportunity to address the problems that lie ahead. There are multiple risks on the horizon. AI financing geopolitical climate and nature related. Many of the prudential risks remain unaddressed in the current framework due to the lack of access to proper data or a lack of appropriate treatment. And to address these problems there would be a need for EU regulation that improves the robust prudential rules and that acknowledges the importance and different aspects of the diverse banking sector. Better ways to identify measure and manage geopolitical climate and nature related risks should be a priority at the moment not a short-sighted focus on an international race to the bottom.
Thank you.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. Thank you to all of you. I can add give the floor back to the to the rapporteur. So the voting icon has been postponed for information from this afternoon. To the icon meeting on December the 1st. Thank you to all of you. We know.
Okay. We now turn to the consideration of amendments to the icon committee yearly report on the ECB. The presentation of the rapporteur draft report in the icon committee on November 3rd as already led to an very rich debate on the governance and independence of the central bank monetary policies. The digital euro and other aspects. Almost 300 amendment were tabled. And we will now listen to the group views on these amendments and I will give the floor first to the rapporteur Mr. Aftias.
Georgios AftiasPPEen
Dear colleagues I will speak Greek
Georgios AftiasPPEel
first of all, I would like to thank most sincerely all my colleagues, Madam President, for their interest in this matter of the European Bank. I also hope for a constructive cooperation on the annual report for 2026 and I wish for it to serve as the basis for that of 2027. Ladies and gentlemen colleagues, I will repeat what I said from the very beginning: as the ancient Greeks used to say, *hekaston*. you will judge the one before existence, and the final outcome will be the agreement, and it will be the work of all, not of one person. Our societies need us united and determined. Therefore, examining all these amendments, I have identified thematic axes, and I mean axes of interest. it is not a common interest for Europe; the energy crisis is not an interest for all of Europe; the digital euro is not an interest for all of Europe; monetary policy—these elements do not distinguish between left, right, centre, liberal, or anything else. All households, all businesses—Mr President—are affected. Any differences that may exist, I believe, Madam President, and I thank you warmly because the your benevolent stance has helped us greatly, I think we can agree, because the problems in Europe are common; I would also like to point out that I would like to stress this: the European Central Bank should first and foremost be a social institution. it must support societies, it must support businesses, it must support the common good the interests of societies and, above all, its independence, because an independent European Central Bank means greater trust for the European citizen. also, the more reliable we are in our proposals, the more social and objective we are, the better we will serve the European citizen, and I thank you warmly and await your observations
Georgios AftiasPPEen
Thank you. On behalf of Matthias Ecker I give the floor to Jonas Fernandes.
Speaker 3en
Thank you. Thank you Chair. Our shadow Matthias Ecker cannot attend to this first and state of views but he asked me for reading a note. So I'm going to to read. You have presented a concise and focused report and it provides a good basis for our work. There is mass in it that we as SND can support. Congratulations and thank you to to the reporter. It's clear on the ECB independence and the rightly so at a time when central bank independence has been openly called into questions elsewhere. Europe must live no doubt that it stands by its own central bank. We welcome the report's position on the digital euro. It's a clear and ambitious commitment. At the same time a concise report leaves room to develop some points further and we see this as an opportunity. First the mandate. The treaty centralized the ECB with two legally binding objectives. Maintaining process stability and supporting the general economic policies of the union. Both form an integral part of its mandate and we would like to see more transparency on how this second objective is reflected. In the ECB decisions. Second the current inflation episode. We are facing another energy price shock driven largely by imported fossil energy. Monetary tightening may weigh on investment and employment without addressing the root causes of price increases. We therefore welcome the ECB's global approach. Note that long-term inflation expectations remain broadly anchored. And ask the ECB to take due account of the impact on investments and employment when considering further rate increases. Third the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. We see the two as complementary. Investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Strengthens our resilience to future energy price shocks. And we will welcome the ECB paying close attention to how financing conditions affect it. The SND has traveled a number of amendments. Our intention is to complement your draft. And in particularly by reflecting some of the recent developments that the euro area is currently facing.
These include for example the growing importance of artificial intelligence both for the economy and for cyber security in the banking sector. The rapid growth of stable coins and the risk may they may pose to monetary sovereignty. Once again thank you so much Mr. Raftias for your work on this report and for your openings so far. We are convinced that together we can find good compromises and make this report a strong and balanced statement of the parliament's position on the ECB. On behalf of Matthias Ecker and the SND group I look forward to our cooperation in the coming weeks. Thank you so much.
Speaker 2en
For PFI, Ms. Pokorna, Germanova. Thank you for the floor. I will continue Czech.
Speaker 2cs
The draft report provides an overall balanced assessment of the European Central Bank's activities. We welcome the emphasis on price stability and on the ECB’s responsibility to explain its decisions to the European Parliament and to the public. With our amendments, we are seeking a more thorough assessment of the development of purchasing power. Even though inflation is slowing down, households may still feel the effects of earlier price increases. We therefore want the report to assess whether wages, pensions and savings returns have kept pace with price growth since 2021. We also welcome the proposal to assess the errors in the forecasts and we want the ECB to explain how these errors have affected the timing of its decisions. The costs and risks associated with bond purchases also deserve the same attention. For us, paragraph 6 is very important, as prudent budgetary policy on the part of the Member States can contribute to price stability and give governments the space to help households during a crisis. In paragraph 7, we support the mention of purchasing power and propose removing the specific requirement for the ECB to report on expenditure on food, energy and housing by income groups. The annual report can assess the broader impacts of inflation, while decisions on support for households remain in the hands of elected governments. On the issue of the digital euro, paragraph 12 calls for a swift agreement to be reached. In paragraphs 12a and 13, it is emphasised that the use of the digital euro should be voluntary and that people should continue to have access to cash and the ability to pay with it, including in less densely populated areas. We welcome these guarantees. Before the report designates the digital euro as necessary, it should assess what advantages it offers compared to existing payment options and how its proposed form would protect citizens' financial privacy and maintain banks' ability to provide credit. And finally, I would like to thank the rapporteur and my shadow rapporteurs for their cooperation and look forward to its continuation.
Speaker 1en
Thank you so much. On behalf of Gilles Boyer, I give the floor to Ludovic Tordor for Renew.
Ľudovít ÓdorRenewen
Thank you very much. And I will also read the points Gilles wanted to make for this file, but unfortunately he cannot be here right now. So first of all, I would like to thank the rapporteur for the quality of the draft report, as well as all my colleagues for the constructive exchanges we have had on the basis of our respective amendments. I believe many of us share the assessments set out in the draft report. Our union is facing a succession of shocks, including the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, whose consequences are waging heavily on households and businesses alike. Mainly through rising costs and persistent uncertainty, in this context our dependence on imported fossil fuels leaves our economy exposed to external shocks. This is precisely why Renew would like the report to explicitly recognize the role of the decarbonization transition in reducing this vulnerability and helping to ensure more stable energy costs. Delivering this transition requires deeper and better integrated capital markets, completing the savings and investment union must therefore remain a priority both to mobilize the necessary financing for the transition and to strengthen our economic resilience. We will continue to advocate for this throughout our negotiations. Our amendments also reiterate the need to give greater consolidation consideration to the broader dimensions of the ECB's mandate beyond its primary objective of maintaining price stability. The ECB has repeatedly acknowledged the importance of supporting the union's general economic policies. At the same time, I would like to stress that monetary policy must be conducted in full respect of the ECB's independence, including its freedom to choose its instruments, its considers appropriate. ECB's independence must indeed be understood in its entirety and unconventional monetary policy instrument must remain part of its available toolkit. Finally, I would once again like to thank the rapporteur for this work. I remain fully available to continue our constructive exchanges.
Our priority must remain clear: safeguarding price stability and ensuring the soundness of our financial system as both are essential pillars of the European Union's long-term prosperity and strategic autonomy. So this is on behalf of Gilles Boyer.
Speaker 1en
Thank you so much. I give the floor to Rasmus Andreessen for the Greens.
Rasmus AndresenVerts/ALEen
Thank you so much. And also from our side, thanks to the rapporteur for the draft report and also for the first meeting. We already had on the on the ECB report and the different amendments. I think this year the report will. Be negotiated in an interesting time because of the changes we will see at the top of the ECB, but also on some of the other posts which the ECB now has to or the member states and the parliament has to has to reflect on. And I mean the report is not about that, but I still think it gives us the opportunity to reflect some of the recent developments in monetary policy and central banking. And that's also what had been part of the amendments or is part of the amendments we tabled. First of all, on price stability, I want to. I want to mention that especially for the colleagues here who are concerned about the issue on price stability and I'm that as well. I think it will be more and more important also to reflect secondary objectives and especially the role of our dependency on fossil fuel energy and energy policy which goes far beyond monetary policy but clearly has an effect here and that's why we tabled some amendments also on the climate factor and climate risks. We would like to see included in the compromises secondly on I think we need further reflections on the question on monetary policy and fiscal coordination and thirdly as one important priority for us also the distributional impact of monetary policy operations for example on housing and the role of institutional investors and the real estate markets is something where we tabled amendments and where I think this year's report should move forward and should not stick to like some of the reports we voted on but we should reflect further and develop our position when it comes to those aspects. I'm looking forward to the next steps. To see the compromises the rapporteur now has to write and I'm looking forward also to find find good and stable compromises. Thanks. Thank you so much.
Speaker 1en
Thank you so much. And I give the floor back to the rapporteur.
Speaker 4el
Thank you to my colleagues. All the proposals that were heard will be included in this final text, which I believe will be the guide for the '27. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1en
Thank you. And the vote in the account committee is planned for January 14. Thank you to all of you. And the voting session will take place at at 5 p. m. in seven minutes.
Speaker 2en
Okay, colleagues, you can go back to your seats so that we can proceed to the vote.
Speaker 2fr
I will start with a test vote. Yes.
Speaker 2en
Okay, we will proceed to. A test vote.
Speaker 3en
Hi. Will. Proceed to a test vote.
Speaker 2en
I'm waiting for you. I'm waiting for you. So I open the vote for a test vote. The vote is opened.
Speaker 4en
Yes, yes, let's keep it.
Speaker 3en
A test vote, colleagues. Shh. Okay, and I close the vote. Okay, everything is working well. Okay, we know. Turn to the agenda. Item 8, amending directive as regards the strengthening of the framework for occupational retirement provision. We. Will start by showing off N of with compromise A, who's in favor, who is against, who abstain, adopted compromise B, who is in favor, who is against, who abstain, adopted compromise C, who is in favor, who is against, levée, c'est pas très grave. Mais pour le dernier vote, attention, il y a... Ah, maintenant il y a trois PPE. On peut pas... Il faut qu'ils enlèvent leur carte.
Speaker 5en
Il f yes, yes.
Speaker 3en
Okay, we begin one more time. Compromise C, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted compromise D, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted compromise E, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted compromise F, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted compromise G, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted compromise H, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted compromise A, I, sorry, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted and. So we have a problem here, I'm sorry. We have three EPP members.
Speaker 4en
Too many.
Speaker 3en
Too many. Actually,.
Speaker 2en
So they have to remove their cards.
Speaker 3en
So three members have to remove their cards.
Speaker 2en
It's okay.
Speaker 3en
It's okay, thank you. So now, my dear friends, we can proceed to the final vote, and I open the vote by roll call. The vote is open. Vote is closed. And it is adopted. Congratulations to the reporters, I mean, Buzzliger, with 33 in favor. No vote. Now. We vote on the mandate by roll call. The vote is open.
Speaker 5en
31 members at least.
Speaker 3en
The vote. Is closed. And the mandate is adopted. Congratulations to the reporters. Now. We now turn to the agenda item 9, the vote on the draft report on the implementation of the VAT reverse charge mechanism. And before the vote, I give the floor to the reporter, Mr. Pierre Pompi. For one minute. The floor is yours.
Speaker 5fr
Very well. So, I will express myself in French. I just wanted to express one great regret, because I think this is a simple subject. So, as you know, this concerns VAT fraud, so I think this is a subject that is supposed to bring us together. It is not a left-wing or right-wing issue or whatever. And in fact, I regret that we did not simply come up with a simple text. Well, that’s part of the game, I suppose. So, these are pretences. It’s still the C. Still the body where Sani Terre is against my group. And so, here I am, regretting that we did not prioritise the interests of the people. That's all.
Speaker 3en
Thank you. The reporter. So we will start the vote, and we will proceed by showing off adds. Compromise alternative A, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. So we move directly to the compromise alternative B, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. We move to compromise alternative C, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. Compromise alternative D, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. Compromise alternative E, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. Compromise alternative F, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. Compromise alternative G, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. And we move to the final vote by roll call vote. I open the vote. And I close the vote. And it is adopted. Thank you to all of you. The next second committee meeting will take place on November 13. And December 1st, 2026, in Brussels.
I don't think that.
Speaker 1en
I really wanted to say,
All right, the committee meeting of the panel for the European Parliament.